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Abstract 
The McCain-Turner semantics of causal rules is based on a fixpoint construction similar to 
the one found in the definition of default logic. In the special case when the heads of the 
rules are literals, it can be equivalently expressed by a translation from sets of rules into sets 
of propos:itional formulas. We define a translation from causal logic into classical logic that 
characterizes the semantics of arbitrary causal rules, without any restrictions on their syntactic 
form. This translation suggests a way to extend the McCain-mmer logic to nonpropositional 
causal theories. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
Keywords: ,4ctions; Causal logic; Circumscription 
1. Introdluction 
The nanmonotonic logic of causal explanation proposed by McCain and Turner [ 111 
provides a simple and powerful formalism for representing properties of actions. Their 
work builds on the analysis of causality due to Geffner [4], on work by Lin [9] and 
on their own research described in [lo]. The main idea of this theory is to distinguish 
between the claim that a proposition is true and the stronger claim that there is a cause 
for it to be true. Causal dependencies are described by “causal rules” of the form 
F +. G (1) 
where F and G are propositional formulas. ’ Rule ( 1) expresses that F has a cause if 
G is true., or that G provides a “causal explanation” for F. 
The definition of the semantics of causal rules (reproduced in Section 7) uses a 
fixpoint construction similar to the one familiar from the definition of an extension in 
‘Thesyntaxusedin [ll] isG+F. 
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default logic [ 131. In the special case when the heads of the rules are literals, the 
semantics can be equivalently expressed by a translation from sets of rules into sets 
of propositional formulas. This translation, called “literal completion”, is similar to the 
completion process used in logic programming [ 31. In [ 121, literal completion is used 
to apply satisfiability planning [ 61 to action domains described by causal theories. 
In this note, we define a translation from causal logic into classical logic that charac- 
terizes the semantics of arbitrary causal rules, without any restrictions on their syntactic 
form. This translation opens the possibility of applying satisfiability planning to causal 
theories with arbitrary formulas in the heads of rules. Furthermore, the new approach to 
the semantics of causal theories suggests a way to extend the McCain-Turner definition 
to nonpropositional rules. The treatment of free variables in nonmonotonic formalisms 
defined by fixpoint conditions is a notoriously difficult problem,2 and the use of a 
translational semantics is crucial for overcoming this difficulty. This extension of the 
MC&in-Turner system allows us to describe causal dependencies in the domains char- 
acterized by nonpropositional theories. In the new framework, large (or even infinite) 
propositional causal theories can be sometimes replaced by compact nonpropositional 
representations. 
The translation that we propose may introduce second-order quantifiers, but in many 
cases of interest these quantifiers can be eliminated. 3 An elimination process leads, in 
particular, to an extension of the process of literal completion to nonpropositional causal 
theories. 
The McCain-Turner semantics is based on the idea that a causal theory should 
“explain” the truth value of every propositional symbol in its language. They characterize 
this “principle of universal causation” as a rather strong philosophical commitment that 
is rewarded by the mathematical simplicity of the theory. In the modification described 
below, we distinguish between “explainable” symbols--those whose values must be 
causally explained by the given rules-and “nonexplainable” ones. 
The formulation of causal logic presented in this note serves as the basis of a new 
action language in the style of [5], in which the concurrent execution of actions can 
be described, and both actions and fluents can be represented by expressions with 
parameters. This is the subject of a forthcoming paper. 
The definition and examples of nonpropositional causal theories are discussed in the 
next two sections. In Section 4 we show how the effects of actions over an infinite set 
of time instants can be described by a finite collection of causal rules with variables. 
A nonpropositional version of literal completion is introduced in Section 5, and its 
correctness is proved in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we show that the McCain- 
Turner semantics of causal rules is indeed equivalent to a special case of the semantics 
proposed in this note. 
2 It is known, for instance, that the semantics of open defaults proposed in [ 131 leads to serious difficulties 
121. 
3 Quantifiers over propositional variables can be always eliminated, although this can make the formula 
significantly longer. There exists an implementation f a process of eliminating quantifiers over predicate 
variables based on the ideas of [l] (http://www.ida.liu.se/labs/kplab/projects/dls/). 
An implementation of another algorithm for the elimination of second-order quantifiers can be found at 
http://www.mpi-sb.mpg.de/guide/staff/ohlb/scan.html. 
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2. Causal theories 
Consider any language of classical logic (propositional, first-order or higher-order, 
possibly ~many-sorted) . A causal rule is an expression of form ( 1), where F and G are 
formulas of this language, called the head and the body of the rule. If the body of a 
rule is the logical constant True, we will drop it and write the rule as F c , 
A causal theory is defined by 
0 a finite set of nonlogical constants 4 of the underlying language, called the explain- 
able symbols of the theory, and 
0 a finite set of causal rules. 
In the definition of the semantics of causal theories below, we use the substitution 
of variab’les for the explainable symbols in a formula. In connection with this, it is 
convenient to denote formulas by expressions like F(E), where E is the list of all 
explainable symbols. Then, for any tuple e of variables that is similar5 to E, the result 
of replacing all occurrences of the constants E in F(E) by the variables e can be 
denoted by F(e). The use of the notation F(E) for a formula does not presume that the 
formula actually contains all explainable symbols; it may even contain no explainable 
symbols at all, in which case F(e) equals F(E). 
Consider a causal theory T with the explainable symbols E and the causal rules 
Fi(E,x’) + Gi(E,x’) (i = 1,. . .), 
where xi is the list of all free variables of the ith rule. Take a tuple e of new variables 
similar to E. By T*(e) we denote the formula 
A Yx’(G~(E,x’) > Fi(e,x’)). 
Note that the occurrences of explainable symbols in the heads are replaced here by 
variables, and the occurrences in the bodies are not. We will view T as shorthand for 
the sentence 
Ve(T*(e) z e = E). (2) 
[The expression e = E stands for the conjunction of the equalities between the members 
of e and the corresponding members of E.) For instance, by a model of T we mean a 
model of (2) ; a theorem of T is a sentence that is entailed by (2). 
Intuitively, the condition T* (e) expresses that the possible values e of the explainable 
symbols E are “explained” by the rules of T. Sentence (2) says that the actual values 
of these symbols are the only ones that are explained by the rules of T. 
4 A nonlogical constant is a function constant or a predicate constant (other than equality). This includes, 
in particular, object constants (function constants of arity 0) and propositional constants (predicate constants 
of arity 0). 
5 The similarity condition means that (i) e has the same length as E, (ii) if the kth member of E is a 
function constant then the kth member of e is a function variable of the same type, and (iii) if the kth member 
of E is a predicate constant then the kth member of e is a predicate variable of the same type. 
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Formula (2) can be equivalently written as 
T*(E) AVe(T*(e) > e = E). (3) 
In this expression, the term T*(E) is the conjunction of the universal closures of the 
implications 
Gi(E,x’) > F;:(E,n’) 
corresponding to the rules of T. 
3. Examples 
Example 1. The only causal rule of T is 
P(x) + Q(x), (4) 
where P and Q are unary predicate constants, and P is explainable. Then T*(p) is 
~dQ(x) >P(x))~ 
where p is a unary predicate variable, and (2) turns into 
'+W'x(Q(x) >P(x)) -_p=P). 
It is easy to check that this second-order formula is equivalent to 
‘d’xP(x) r\VxQ(x). (5) 
What is the intuitive meaning of this result? Since the predicate constant P is declared 
explainable, the value of P at every point x should be “explained” by the causal rules 
of T. The only rule of T explains P(x) , but it does not explain 1P (x) . So all values of 
P can be explained only if P is identically true. Furthermore, this rule explains P(x) 
only for the values of x that satisfy Q. So all values of P can be explained only if Q is 
identically true as well. 
Example 2. The causal rules of T are (4) and 
-P(x) +- lP(X), 
where P and Q are as in Example 1. Now T*(p) is 
VdQ(x) IP(X>) AVd+-'(x) 3 -P(X)>, 
and (2) becomes 
(6) 
VP{ W'x(Q(x) IP( AVd+'(x) ~T(x))I= p=P}. 
Proposition 1 below shows that this causal theory is equivalent to 
Vx(P(x) = Q(X)). (7) 
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Intuitively, rule (6) says that, whenever P is false at a point x, there is a cause for 
this. If this rule is included in a causal theory then the other rules should allow us to 
explain every case when P is true. Since Q(X) is the only possible explanation for 
P(x), P turns out to be equivalent to Q. 
Note that (5) is a theorem of the theory from Example 1, but not a theorem of the 
theory obtained from it by adding rule (6). This fact illustrates the nonmonotonic char- 
acter of causal theories. The nonmonotonicity of the formalism is not surprising, because 
the formulas representing the rules of T occur negatively in the second conjunctive term 
of (3). This term is similar, in this sense, to the minimality condition in the definition 
of circumscription. 
Including rule (6) in a causal theory is similar to postulating that P is “false by 
default”, or, in other words, to circumscribing P. The following proposition makes this 
precise: 
Proposition 1. A causal theory of the form 
&c- (l<i<m), 
TP(X) +- -P(x), 
where P is the only explainable symbol of the theory a%d x is a tuple of distinct 
variables, is equivalent to the circumscription of P in /\z, VFi. 6 
To apply this proposition to Example 2, observe first that (4) can be rewritten as 
Q(X) > P(x) + 
without changing the formula T*(p) . It follows that the causal theory of Example 2 is 
equivalent to the circumscription of P in Vx( Q ( X) > P(x) ) , that is, to (7). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote the given causal theory by T, and let F(P) stand for 
A”,, VE. Then 
T*(P) = F(p) AV-x(+(x) 1 TP(X>> = F(p) A (P < f’> 
(for notartion, see [ 8, Section 2.11) , and consequently 
TzF(P)AVp(F(p)A(p<P)>p=P) 
= F(P) Avp(p < P > lF(p)). 0 
Examples 1 and 2 are different from causal theories in the sense of [ 1 l] in two ways. 
First, they are nonpropositional. Second, in these examples we distinguish between 
the explainable symbols (P) and the nonexplainable symbols (Q) ; as pointed out 
in the introduction, McCain and Turner require a causal explanation for every symbol. 
Technically, the availability of nonexplainable symbols in our version of the theory is not 
6 By VF we denote the universal closure of F. 
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very essential: Reclassifying a predicate constant Q as explainable could be neutralized 
by adding the causal rules 
Q(x) + Q(x), 
-Q(x) + -Q(x), 
(8) 
which say that, whatever the truth value of Q(x) is, there is a cause for this formula to 
have that value. More precisely: 
Proposition 2. Let T be a causal theory containing rules (8)) where Q is an explain- 
able predicate constant and x is a tuple of distinct variables. The causal theory obtained 
from T by deleting Q from the set of explainable symbols and dropping rules (8) is 
equivalent to T. 
For instance, the causal theory whose rules are 
P(x) + Q(x), 
-P(x) + lP(X), 
Q(x) +- Q(x), 
(9) 
lQ<x> + -Q(x), 
where both P and Q are explainable, is equivalent to the theory of Example 2. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let E be the list of all explainable symbols other than Q, and 
let T, be the causal theory obtained from T by deleting Q from the set of explainable 
symbols and dropping rules (8). Then 
T-T*(E,Q)Atleq(T*(e,q) > (e=EAq=Q>) 
=T;“WQ> Ak[U’T(e,q) A’WQW 3 d-4) 
AVx(-Q(x) >lq(x))) > (e=EAq=Q>] 
-TT(E,Q) AVeq((T;(e,q) Aq=Q) > (e=EAq=Q>> 
zT;(E,Q) AVe(Tp(e,Q) > e = E) 
= -Tl. 0 
4. Describing actions by causal rules 
Example 2 has a simple interpretation in terms of actions and their effects. Imagine 
that Q(X) represents an action (more precisely, the assertion that a certain action is 
executed during a particular interval of time), and that P(x) represents a fluent (more 
precisely, the assertion that a certain truth-valued fluent holds after performing the 
action). Then rule (4) tells us that, after performing the action, there is a cause for 
the fluent to hold. Rule (6) expresses that this fluent is “false by default”-that it is 
“momentary” in the sense of [ 71. 
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This interpretation is appropriate, for instance, if Q(x) represents plucking string x 
on the guitar, and P(x) means that string x sounds. Conclusion (7), sanctioned by the 
semantics of causal rules introduced above, reflects the commonsense fact that a string 
sounds if and only if it has just been plucked. This applies, in particular, to the case 
when Q(x) holds for more than one value of X, that is, when several strings are plucked 
simultaneously. 
The next example differs from Example 2 in two ways. First, instead of momentary 
fluents, we consider fluents governed by the commonsense law of inertia. Second, instead 
of considering the effect of a single action, we trace the evolution of the fluents along an 
infinite sequence of instants of time. The language will include a second sort of variables, 
for natural numbers, and each of the predicates P, Q will get a second argument of 
this new sort. We will follow the style of formalization proposed in [ 111, except that 
the availability of variables will allow us to replace an infinite set of axioms by a finite 
one. 
Example 3. The causal rules of T are 
n’ # 0 +, 
m’=:n’>m=nt, 
P(0) A Vm(p(m) 1 p(m’)) 1 p(n) +, 
P(x,n’) + Q(x,n), 
P(x,n’) t P(x.n) A P(x,n’), 
1P(x,n’) + -P(x,n) A 7P(x,n’), 
P(x,O) + P(&O), 
TP(X,O) c lP(X,O), 
and P is explainable. The first three rules characterize the system of natural numbers 
by the standard Peano axioms, using the predicate variable p to express induction. The 
fourth rule describes the effect of Q on P; P( x, n) expresses that P(x) holds at time 
n, and Q(x. n) expresses that the action Q(x) is executed between times n and IZ’. The 
next pair of rules expresses the law of inertia for P by saying that there is a cause for 
P(x) to be true (false) at time n’ if it is true (respectively, false) both at time n and 
at time 1;~‘. The last two rules are similar to (8) ; their effect is to obviate the need to 
explain the values of P at the initial instant of time. 
In the next section we will see that this theory is equivalent to the conjunction of the 
Peano axioms (that is, the heads of the first three rules) and the condition 
P(x,n’) s P(x,n) VQ(x,n). (10) 
5. Literal completion 
Consider a causal theory T such that every explainable symbol of T is a predicate 
constant. A causal rule is definite relative to T if its head 
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l is a literal that does not contain explainable symbols of T in argument positions, or 
l does not contain explainable symbols of T. 
A causal theory T is definite if every rule of T is a definite rule. 
The causal theories from Examples l-3 are definite. The need to have formulas more 
complex than literals in the heads of causal rules arises, for instance, when an explicitly 
defined symbol is added to the language [ 111; a definitional extension of a causal theory 
is not definite. 
The process of completion described below turns any definite causal theory into an 
equivalent set of sentences of classical logic. If the heads and the bodies of all rules of 
the theory are first-order formulas, as in Examples 1 and 2, then the resulting sentences 
are first-order also. Moreover, we will see that even in Example 3, where one of the 
rules includes a predicate variable, completion does not introduce any new higher-order 
variables and thus leads to a simple result. 
The main new feature of literal completion in comparison with the completion process 
defined in [3] is that the “completed definition” of a predicate constant P consists of 
two equivalences, one “positive” and one “negative”. 
The algorithm takes any definite causal theory T as input. By P we denote any 
explainable symbol of T; PE stands for P if E = 1 and for 7P if E = -1. Using this 
notation, we can write any literal whose predicate symbol is explainable as PE ( t) , where 
t is a tuple of terms. We perform successively the following steps. 
Step 1. For each P, take a tuple of new variables x and replace each rule of the form 
P”(t) +- G by P”(x) +- (x = t) A G. 
Step 2. Replace each rule P”(x) t G obtained in the previous step by P”(x) c 3yG, 
where y are the free variables of the original rule. 
Step 3. For each P and each E, replace all rules P”(x) +- Gi by the rule P”(x) + 
ViGi. 
Step 4. For each P and each E, replace the rule P”(x) +-- G obtained in the previous 
step by the sentence q( PE (x) 3 G) . 
Step 5. Replace each remaining rule F +- G by the sentence v( G > F) . 
The sentences obtained in this way are called the completion sentences for T. 
Completion Theorem. Every definite causal theory is equivalent to the conjunction of 
its completion sentences. 
In the examples of literal completion below, we use classical logic to simplify the 
bodies of the rules after some of the steps. The formulas obtained at the end of this 
process are logically equivalent to the completion sentences. 
Example 1 (continued). The result of Step 1 is 
P(xl) t XI =x A Q(x). 
Step 2 leads to 
P(xI) +3x(x1 =xAQO),, 
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which can be rewritten as 
P(xI) + Q(~I). 
Step 3 adds the second rule 
UP t False. 
Step 4 produces the equivalences 
‘dxt(P(xl) = Q(m)), 
Vxl(~P(xl) E False). 
It is clear that the conjunction of these formulas is logically equivalent to (5). 
Example 2 (continued). After the first two steps, we get 
P(xI) + 12(x1), 
lP(X,) + TP(X,). 
Step 3 does not change these rules, and the result of Step 4 is 
Vxl(P(xl) = Q(n)), 
‘tlicl(?P(Xl) = ,P(Xl)). 
It is clear that the conjunction of these formulas is logically equivalent to (7). 
Example 3 (continued). After Steps 1 and 2, we get 
n’ Z Ot, 
m’=n’>m=nt, 
P(Oll A Vm(p(m) 3 p(m’)) 3 p(n) +, 
P(xl,ml) +3n(ml =n’AQ(xl,n)), 
P(xl,ml) + 3n(ml = n’ A P(xl,n) A P(xl,n’)), 
-P(xl,ml) + 3n(ml =n’A-P(xl,n) A~P(xl,n’)), 
P(xl,ml) +ml =OAP(xl,O), 
-P(xl,ml) -ml =OATP(XI,O), 
and Step 3 gives 
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n’ #O+, 
I m =n’>m=n+, 
~(0) A ~m(p(m) 3 p(m’> > 3 p(n) +, 
P(xl,ml) +Mml =n’AQ(m,n)) 
V3n(ml =n’AP(xl,n) AP(xl,n’)) 
V (ml =OA P(x1,0)), 
TP(xl,ml) c 3n(ml =n’AlP(xl,n) A~P(xl,n’)) 
V(ml =OA~P(xl,O)). 
The completion sentences are 
PA, 
Vxlml[P(xl,ml) -3n(m1 =n’AQ(xl,n)) 
V!h(ml =n’AP(xl,n) AP(xr,n’)) 
V (ml =OAP(xl,O))l, 
Vxlml[~P(xl,ml) =3n(ml =n’AlP(xl,n) AlP(xl,n’)) 
V (ml =OA~P(xl,O))l, 
where PA stands for the Peano axioms 
Vn(n’ # 0), 
Vmn(m’ =n’>m=n), 
bn[p(O) A Vm(p(m) 3 p(m’)) 3 p(n) I. 
The fact that every number other than 0 has a unique successor, which is a logical 
consequence of PA, can be used to rewrite the conjunction of the last two completion 
sentences as the universal closure of ( 10). 
6. Proof of the completion theorem 
The proof of the completion theorem is based on the fact that a definite theory can 
be decomposed into “simple” parts. The decomposition process is of interest in its own 
right, because it can be also used to simplify some theories that are not definite. 
About causal theories Tr , T2 with sets El, E2 of explainable symbols we say that they 
are disjoint if 
l El and E2 are disjoint sets, 
l the symbols in El do not occur in the heads of the rules of T2, and the symbols in 
E2 do not occur in the heads of the rules of Tl. 
For any pair-wise disjoint causal theories Tl , . . . , T,,,, define their union to be the causal 
theory obtained by combining their rules and their explainable symbols. 
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Lemma .3. The union of pairwise disjoint causal theories Tl, . . . , T, is equivalent to 
the conjunction Tl A . . . A T,,. 
Proof. 
Tl(E1) A.-.AT,,(E,,,) 
AVel.. -e,((Tl(el) A-.. AT,(e,)) 3 (el=El A..-Ae,=E,)) 
::T,(E*) A...AT,(E,) 
AQel .. -e,f(Tl(el) A--* ATm(em)) 3 el =EI) 
A . . . 
AVel .. .ed(Tl(el) A-- .ATde,)) 3 em =Ed 
::Tl(EI) /I..-AT,(E,,,) 
AVel((Tl(el) AJezTz(e2) A...A3e,T,(e,)) >el =EI) 
A . . . 
AVe,((3elTi(el) A... A 3e,-lT,-I (em-l) A T,(e,)) 3 em = Em) 
z: T,(El) A...AT,(E,) 
AVel(Tl(el) >el =El) A...AVe,(T,(e,) 3em=E,) 
z: T, A. .. AT,. 0 
A causal theory T is simple if it consists of two rules 
P(n) +- Gl (x), 
+‘(x) +- G2(n) 
(11) 
such that 
l P isi the only explainable symbol of T, 
l x is a tuple of distinct variables, 
l G1 (x), G2( x) are formulas containing no free variables other than the members 
of x. 
For instance, the theory from Example 2 is simple. It is clear that every simple theory 
is definite. The following lemma shows that any simple theory is equivalent to the pair 
of sentences obtained from it by applying Step 4 of the completion process. 
Lemma 4. Any simple theory ( 11) is equivalent to 
Vx(P(x) = G,(x)) AVx(lP(x) = Go). (12) 
Proof. For a simple theory ( 11) , sentence (3) turns into 
V’x(Gl(x) > P(x)) AVx(G2(x) 3 UP) 
A~P[(WG(X) 3 P(X)) AVx(G(x) 3 -P(X))) 3~ =Plv 
or, equivalently, 
462 V 
Vx(G,(x) > P(x)> AVx(Gz(x) > -P(x)) 
AVP[(VX(GI(~) 3 P(X)) AV’x(p(x) 3 432tx))) 2 Vx(p(x) I P(x))1 
A VP[ W’x(G (x) 3 P(X)> A WP(X) 3 42(x)) 1 3 ‘v’x(P(x) I p(x) > 1. 
(13) 
To eliminate the second-order quantifiers in the last two conjunctive terms, observe that 
these terms can be written as the negations of the sentences 
$[V’x(Gi (x) 1 P(X)) A Vx(p(x) 1+2(x) > A +‘x(p(x) II P(x) > 1 (14) 
and 
$Wx(Gl(x) IL’(X)) AV’x(p(x) 3 +32(x)) A+df’(x> ~P(x))I. (15) 
The second conjunctive term of (14) contains a negative occurrence of p, and the 
occurrences of p in the other two conjunctive terms are positive. Consequently, ( 14) is 
equivalent to 
V.x(Gl(x) > 7G2(x)) A +x(7G2(x) > P(x)>. 
In the presence of the first two conjunctive terms of ( 13), this can be further rewritten 
as 
+x(7G2(x) > P(x)). 
The first conjunctive term of (15) contains a positive occurrence of p, and the oc- 
currences of p in the other two conjunctive terms are negative. Consequently, (15) is 
equivalent to 
Vx(Gl(x) > 7G2(x)) A+‘x(P(x) > Gl(x)). 
In the presence of the first two conjunctive terms of ( 13), this can be further rewritten 
as 
+‘x(P(x> > Gl(x)). 
Consequently, ( 13) is equivalent to 
Vx(Gl(x) > P(x)) AVx(G2(x) 3 d’(x)) 
AVx(lG2(x) > P(x)) AVx(P(x) 3 G](x)), 
which is equivalent to (12). •1 
Proof of the Completion Theorem. Let T be a definite theory with the explainable 
symbols Pi,. . . , P,,,, and let T’ be the theory obtained from T after Steps l-3 of the 
completion process. It is easy to see that T’ is equivalent to T. For each i = 1, . . . , m, let 
Ti be the theory whose rules are the rules of T’ that contain Pi in the head and whose 
only explainable symbol is Pia Let Tm+l be the theory whose rules are the rules of T’ that 
are not included in any of the theories Tl , . . . , T,,, and whose set of explainable symbols 
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is empty. It is clear that the theories Tt , . . . , Tm, T,,,+l are pair-wise disjoint, and that their 
union is 7”. By Lemma 3, it follows that T’ is equivalent to TI A 1 - . AT,,, A T”*+l. Each of 
the theories TI , . . . , T,,, is simple. By Lemma 4, it follows that the formula Tl A. . . AT,,, 
is equivaknt to the conjunction of the completion sentences obtained in Step 4. Since 
the heads of the rules of Tm+l do not include explainable symbols, it follows that T’ is 
equivalent to the conjunction of all completion sentences for T. q 
7. Relation to the McCain-Turner definition 
The semantics of causal rules according to [ 111 can be defined as follows. Let T be 
a set of propositional causal rules. For any interpretation Z of the language of T, let 
T’ be the set of the heads of all rules of T whose bodies are satisfied by I. We say 
that Z is causally explained according to T if Z is the only model of T’. A formula F 
is a consequence of T if every interpretation that is causally explained according to T 
satisfies ET. 
Considser, for instance, the propositional counterpart of rules (9): 
P + Q, 
TP (- -p, 
Q + Q, 
For the interpretation Z that makes both P and Q true, T’ consists of the formulas P 
and Q. Since Z is the only model of these formulas, it is causally explained according 
to T. The interpretation that makes both P and Q false is causally explained also. The 
two other interpretations of the language of T are not causally explained. 
To relate the notion of a causally explained interpretation to the semantics of causal 
theories defined in Section 2, let us agree to identify a set of propositional causal rules 
with the causal theory which consists of these rules and in which every propositional 
constant is explainable. For instance, we will consider rules 16 as the rules of the 
propositional causal theory T in which both P and Q are explainable. 
Proposition 5. For any set T of propositional causal rules and any interpretation I, Z 
is causal/y explained according to T ifl Z is a model of T. 
For instance, the two interpretations that are causally explained according to 16 are 
the models of P = Q. 
As a corollary, we conclude that the consequences of a set of propositional causal 
rules as defined by McCain and Turner are the same as its consequences in the sense 
of Section 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let 
Fi(P) +-G,(P) (i= l,...) 
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be the rules of T, where P is the list of all propositional constants. Then (2) is 
‘QW*(p) = P = Z-‘), 
where T*(p) stands for Ai( Gi( P) > Fi(p)). Take an interpretation I, and let I^( P) 
be the conjunction of all literals satisfied by I. It is clear that I is a model of T iff the 
formula 
i-(P) AVp(T*(p) -p =P) 
is satisfiable. In the presence of r(P), T* (p) can be replaced by T’ Q), where T’(P) is 
the conjunction of all formulas in T’, and p = P can be replaced by Z(p). Consequently, 
Z is a model of T iff the formula 
r(P) A VP@(P) = T(P)) (17) 
is satisfiable. Since the first conjunctive term Z(P) is satisfiable and the second con- 
junctive term 
~P(T’(P) = F(P)) (18) 
does not contain any nonlogical constants, ( 17) is satisfiable iff ( 18) is logically valid. 
Furthermore, the logical validity of ( 18) is equivalent to the logical validity of 
T’(P) E r(P). 
This formula is logically valid iff Z satisfies T’(P). II 
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